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Abstract—This paper discusses malicious false data injection
attacks on the wide area measurement and monitoring system
in smart grids. Firstly, methods of constructing sparse stealth
attacks are developed for two typical scenarios: random attacks in
which arbitrary measurements can be compromised and targeted
attacks in which specified state variables are modified. It is
already demonstrated that stealth attacks can always exist if the
number of compromised measurements exceeds a certain value.
In this paper it is found that random undetectable attacks can
be accomplished by modifying only a much smaller number of
measurements than this value. It is well known that protecting
the system from malicious attacks can be achieved by making a
certain subset of measurements immune to attacks. An efficient
greedy search algorithm is then proposed to quickly find this
subset of measurements to be protected to defend against stealth
attacks. It is shown that this greedy algorithm has almost the
same performance as the brute-force method but without the
combinatorial complexity. Thirdly, a robust attack detection
method is discussed. The detection method is designed based on
the robust principal component analysis problem by introducing
element-wise constraints. This method is shown to be able to
identify the real measurements as well as attacks even when only
partial observations are collected. The simulations are conducted
based on IEEE test systems.
Index Terms—Malicious data attack, bad data detection, smart
grid security, robust principle component analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
Compared to the traditional power grids, a smart grid
tends to be much more reliable, efficient, and intelligent
due to the remarkable advancements in sensing, monitoring,
control technologies, and also the tight integration with cyber
infrastructure and advanced computing and communication
technologies [1]. However, this integration can lead to new
vulnerabilities to cyber attacks on the power systems. Cyber
attacks are reported as one of the main potential threats to the
reliable operation of the power system [2], [3]. In this paper,
we consider false data injection attacks (FDIA) against the
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Figure 1. A illustration of the power grid, communication network, SCADA
and control center. The warning signs indicate the vulnerabilities to false data
injection attacks.
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system in
smart grids.
A power grid transmission system is a sophisticated network
which connects a number of electric power generators to var-
ious consumers through extensive power lines. It is extremely
important to monitor the state of this complex system such that
various control and planning tasks can be performed and the
reliable operation of the power system is guaranteed. In power
systems, state estimation [4], [5] is used to estimate system
state variables through a number of power measurements and
is a useful and necessary function in energy management
systems (EMS).
The SCADA system obtains power status information such
as transmission line power flows, bus voltages and also circuit-
braker signals through remote terminal units (RTUs). These
measurements are then used for the state estimation process
in EMS, which builds real-time electricity network models. In
smart grids, the complex network connections as well as the
Internet make SCADA systems susceptible to potential FDIAs,
in which adversaries aim to contaminate the measurements
collected from RTUs and bias the state estimation at the
transmission level in order to mislead the operation of the
power system. It is critically important to understand the
behavior of adversaries so that appropriate countermeasures
2can be designed to either protect the system from attacks
beforehand or identify the malicious false data injections in
the measurements.
Recently, the problem of false data injection attacks as well
as countermeasures has attracted a lot of attention among
researchers. False data in state estimation was first discussed
by F.C. Schweppe et al. in their pioneering work about state
estimation [6]. It was not well researched until authors in [7]
proposed that if adversaries possess the knowledge of power
grid topology, they may inject coordinated data attacks, which
could evade detection by the bad data detection (BDD) system
in state estimator. Based on this strategy, plenty of efforts
have been made to design effective attack algorithms and the
corresponding countermeasures, such as [8], [9], [10], [11].
Adversaries may launch attacks through hacking RTUs such
as sensors in substations. In consideration of the accessibility
of RTUs and also hacking cost, attackers always tend to control
only a few RTUs to implement a successful attack [7]. Authors
in [8] developed a general optimization framework based
formulation for constructing sparse attack vectors when a
subset of measurements are protected, while [12] extended the
sparse attack construction model to a distributed framework.
Authors in [13] considered sparse attacks with injections into
critical measurements, which are essential for the observability
of the power grids and sensitive to attacks. In [14], methods
of finding both strong stealth attacks and also optimal weak
malicious data attacks (when power grid topology is unknown)
with the aim of reducing the number of compromised measure-
ments were discussed. It has been proposed that even when
the power grid information is unavailable, stealth attacks can
still be accomplished [15], [16]. Authors in [17] investigated
the attack strategy with consideration of communication rate
constraint in cyber-physical systems.
There are two approaches to defend against the malicious
data attacks. The first is to protect the system beforehand from
being attacked by adversaries. This can be achieved by either
protecting a number of measurements to prevent stealth attacks
[18], [19], or monitoring state information directly by the
deployment of phasor measurements units (PMU) [8], [20].
In practice, it is not feasible to secure all measurements to
prevent attacks due to the high cost. Instead, stealth malicious
attacks can be prevented by protecting a carefully selected
subset of measurements. A challenge of this approach is to
search the effective small measurement subset to make them
immune to attacks. Authors in [18] chose the subsets for small
power test systems using brute-force search.
The second approach to deal with malicious attacks is to
identify the injected false data in measurements and then either
abandon the contaminated data or correct them. Traditional
false data detection methods are based on residue test [6], [21].
They cannot protect state estimation from carefully designed
stealth attacks. Recently, with the advancement of smart grid,
new detection methods have been proposed. A survey of the
existing detection methods was provided in [22]. In [14],
generalized likelihood ratio test is introduced to detect weak
false data injection attacks. The CUSUM test based detection
mechanism introduced in [16] is also designed for non-stealth
attacks. Authors in [23] discussed stealth false data detection
methods using machine learning. Graphical methods are used
to design defending mechanisms in [24]. In [11], an effective
method capable of detecting false data as well as recovering
the real state information was proposed. In [25], both the
attack and detection algorithms were discussed but the subset
protection method was not considered. Additionally, only pre-
liminary results regarding the attack strategies was presented
in [25]. This paper substantially discusses the methods of
sparse attack construction, the strategy of system protection
from attacks, and the algorithm of stealth attack detection.
This paper has made three contributions: Firstly, methods
of constructing stealth attacks are proposed for two typical
scenarios. We consider a general scenario in which adversaries
can access arbitrary measurements to change arbitrary state
variables in state estimation. To the best of our knowledge,
there is no feasible algorithm that can efficiently construct
highly sparse undetectable attack vectors in this case. In [7],
it is observed that the optimal undetectable attack vector to
compromise the minimum number of measurements can be
found using brute-force search. However, this is not practical
due to the high complexity. We propose an efficient and ef-
fective attack vector construction algorithm which can quickly
generate highly sparse attack vectors in this scenario.
Authors in [7] also have demonstrated that stealth attack
vectors always exist when the number of measurements that
can be contaminated exceeds a certain value. However, it is
shown in this paper that our proposed method can launch
stealth attacks by manipulating only a much smaller number
of measurements with high probability. Additionally, stealth
attacks in a specific scenario are also considered in this paper.
An optimization based algorithm is introduced to generate
sparse targeted attack vectors to bias specified state variables
with the consideration that a subset of measurements are
protected.
A fast greedy search method is then proposed to quickly
find a subset of measurements to be protected to defend
against stealth attacks. This fast method can find a subset
with the same size as brute-force search in nearly all cases.
Finally, inspired by [11], we introduce a detection algorithm
considering the noise case with partial observations. The
proposed algorithm extends the method in [11] to address the
problem of detecting stealth attacks as well as recovering true
state information with only partially collected contaminated
measurements. The performance of the proposed algorithms
is investigated using IEEE test systems with software MAT-
POWER [26].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
introduces power system model and the stealth attack problem
in state estimation. In section III, proposed attack strategies
for different scenarios are introduced. Section IV provides the
measurement protection algorithm and section V presents the
false data detection method. Simulation results are presented
in section VI and the last section concludes the paper.
II. POWER GRID AND ATTACK MODEL
In this paper, we consider a power transmission grid which
consists of n+ 1 buses and l transmission lines. The network
3connectivity of this power grid can be described by the
(n+ 1) × l oriented incidence matrix M, of which each
column corresponds to the power line (i, j) and consists of all
0s except the i-th and j-th elements having value of 1 and −1
respectively [27]. The non-singular diagonal matrix D ∈ Rl×l
describes the physical properties of the transmission grid
with diagonal entries equal to admittance of the transmission
lines. SCADA collects measurements from RTUs such as bus
voltages, bus power injections and branch power flows from
the power grid and sends them to the state estimator to estimate
the state of the power system in the control center.
A. State estimation
The state estimation problem is to use power measurements
to timely estimate the state of the power system. Specifically,
power system state refers to bus voltage angles θ and bus
voltage magnitudes V . In the linearized DC power flow model
[4, Ch. 2], bus magnitudes are assumed already known and are
all close to unity. Additionally phase angle at reference bus
is set to zero radians, thus estimation of only n bus voltage
angles [θ1, θ2, . . . , θn]
T are required. The measurements have
the following relationship with the state variables:
z = Hθ + e, (1)
where z = [z1, z2, . . . , zm]
T denotes measurement vector and
H ∈ Rm×n is the measurement Jacobian matrix constructed
by H =
[
DMT
MDMT
]
. e = [e1, e2, . . . , em]
T represents the
Gaussian measurement noise and it is assumed to be zero-
mean for convenience [14]. Measurements include power flows
on l transmission lines and power injection at n buses. In
the DC power flow model, power from bus i to j can be
approximated as
Pij = (θi − θj) dij , (2)
where dij is the admittance of the transmission line from bus
i to j. Thus power flows on transmission lines are computed
by MDMT θ and power injections at buses are obtained from
DMT θ.
The state vector can be estimated from measurements using
the weighted least-square (WLS) method [4]. In particular,
system states are estimated as
θˆ =
(
HTWH
)−1
HTWz = Kz, (3)
where diagonal weighting matrix W has diagonal entries
equaling to the inverse of noise variances and K =(
HTWH
)−1
HTW.
B. False data injection attacks
Malicious false data can be injected by manipulating the
RTU measurements in order to bias the estimated states.
System measurements with malicious data becomes:
za = Hθ + a + e, (4)
where a = [a1, a2, . . . , am]
T denotes the attack vector.
Bad data in measurements can lead to incorrect state es-
timation and cause severe outcomes. Traditional methods to
detect bad data are mostly based on the residue test. The
residue vector r refers to the difference between the obtained
measurements and the computed value from the estimated
state:
r = z−Hθˆ. (5)
For example, the largest normalized residue (LNR) test iden-
tifies bad data if the absolute value of the largest element in
r is larger than a certain threshold τ , i.e., maxi |ri| > τ .
However, carefully designed malicious data attacks can
bypass residue based bad data detection. If attackers have
knowledge about the power grid topology information, or H,
they can inject stealth attacks by constructing the attack vector
such that [7]:
a = Hc. (6)
The measurements can then be written as:
za =H (θ + c) + e, (7)
where c ∈ Rn is any arbitrary vector and denotes the errors
added to the state variables introduced by a. The attack is un-
detectable as the residue r would not change compared to that
without attack a [7]. The system will regard the manipulated
state (θ + c) as the real value in the state estimator.
III. STEALTH ATTACK STRATEGIES
In order to evade detection in the control center, attack
vectors are designed to satisfy equation (6). Additionally,
attackers would tend to compromise as few measurements as
possible in effort to launch attacks with least effort. Therefore
attack strategies are expected to be able to construct highly
sparse attack vectors. The stealth sparse attacks were first
discussed in [7], in which the authors proposed that attackers
can modify state variables in state estimation without being
detected by modifying a small number of carefully chosen
RTU measurements. In this paper, two methods are introduced
to construct sparse attack vectors for two typical scenarios:
random attacks in which arbitrary measurements can be com-
promised and targeted attacks in which specific state variables
need to be biased.
A. Random attacks
In this scenario it is assumed that no measurements are
protected, and the changes of state variables are not specified.
Attackers can hack arbitrary measurements to bias arbitrary
state variables. Thus, the aim is solely to find highly sparse
vector a that satisfies (6). To the best of our knowledge, there
is no feasible algorithm that can efficiently construct sparse
attack vectors in this case. Since a is a linear combination
of the columns of H, it is possible to generate sparse vector
by column transformation of H. However this method cannot
guarantee sparsity. It is demonstrated by authors in [7] that
a k-sparse stealth attack vector always exist if k > m − n.
We propose a novel method that can construct a sparse attack
vector with much smaller k.
4Authors in [7] also proposed that a projection matrix
P = H
(
HTH
)−1
HT can lead to a equivalent criteria to
generate attack vector a satisfying (6):
Pa = H
(
HTH
)−1
HTHc = Hc
(P− I) a = 0.
Let B = P− I, then undetectable attack vector a satisfies:
Ba =0. (8)
This criteria can be used to generate attack vectors in certain
scenarios such as when a subset of measurements are protected
[7]. For random attacks, this criteria can also be utilized.
A straightforward way to find sparse attack vectors can be
formulated using the following optimization problem:
min ‖a‖0
s.t.Ba =0, a 6= 0, (9)
where l0-norm is the number of the nonzero elements in a.
This is a non-convex problem and finding the solution to
this problem is highly complex. However, it is obvious that
a feasible vector a must be in the null space of matrix B,
which is defined as:
Null(B) = {v ∈ Rm |Bv = 0} . (10)
Rather than solving the complex problem in (9), we propose
an algorithm taking advantage of null space of B, which can
be easily computed.
Proposed algorithm: Measurements are always subject to
noise due to the errors in the measuring process and the noise
in the communication channels. The noise can be modeled as
Gaussian distributed with variance Σe. The system is usually
designed to be tolerant to measurement deviations within the
noise level. Additionally, vectors in the null space of B usually
comprise a small number of relatively large elements and the
majority are small value elements. It provides the possibility
for attackers to inject attack vectors designed based on vectors
in Null(B). Those small valued elements can be dealt with as
noise if the their average energy, denoted as ΣB , is within the
range of the variance of the noise Σe, namely, ΣB ≤ Σe.
Therefore, attackers only need to inject elements of large
values in the column vectors of Null(B) into the system
and the number of measurements to be compromised will be
greatly reduced. We define a shrinkage operation St as follows:
St (x) :=
{
x
|x|−t max (|x| − t, 0) |x| 6= t
x |x| = t . (11)
The attack vector construction procedure can then be de-
signed as follows: Given matrix measurement matrix H,
compute matrix B as well as the standard basis matrix U of
its null space Null(B) and choose vector u with the largest
variance from all column vectors in U:
u = arg max
i
(var (ui)) , (12)
where ui denotes the i-th column in U. Then, scale vector
u up, or down, till the maximal element reaches a designed
Algorithm 1 Sparse stealth attacks construction
Input: H ∈ Rm×n, C > 0, t > 0.
Procedure:
1) Compute B = H
(
HTH
)−1
HT − I.
2) Get the standard basis matrix U of Null(B) so that i-th
column ui: Bui = 0.
3) Find column vector u in U: u = arg maxi(var(ui)).
4) Scale up/down vector u by : u′ = u and  = Cmax(u) .
5) Shrink the vector using the threshold t to obtain the
sparse attack vector a: a = St (u′).
Output: a.
attack value C. The last step is to force the small elements
below threshold t to 0:
a = St (u) , (13)
where  = Cmax(u) .
Algorithm 1 concludes the whole process of attack vector
construction. It is notable that threshold t should be carefully
chosen in the consideration of both sparsity and evading bad
data detection. A higher t can generate a sparser attack vector
but also increase the possibility of being detected. It is also
notable that if the noise is not zero-mean, the threshold t
is chosen according to the tolerable noise range. Since the
measurement noise follows N (0, σ2), it is assumed that all
noise variables are within the range of [−3σ, 3σ] (otherwise
it will be identified as bad data). Thus, threshold t should not
exceed 3σ. The following proposition can assist in choosing
threshold t:
Proposition 1. If an attack vector a is constructed using
Algorithm 1 with the shrinkage threshold t, the probability
of successfully evading detection by residue based detection
algorithms in the system is at least:
Pl(t) =
1
2
[
1 + erf
(
3σ − t
σ
√
2
)]
, (14)
where erf(·) refers to the Gauss error function and σ is the
standard deviation of the Gaussian measurement noise.
Proof: Since the vector u is selected form Null(B), it
satisfies u = Hc, where c ∈ Rn. Let a = St (u) = u− ut.
The residual vector r′ when attack a is injected into system
is calculated as:
r′ =za −Hθˆa = z + a + e−HK(z + a + e)
=Hx + Hc− ut + e−H(KHx + KHc−Kut + Ke)
=Hx + Hc− ut + e−Hx− Hc + HKut −HKe
=(I−HK)(e− ut). (15)
Equation (15) indicates that when an attack generated by
algorithm 1 exists, it can be regarded that the random noise is
perturbed by small amounts. A very small element comparing
to σ in ut should not impact the noise level or the residue since
the shifted noise variable is still within the tolerable range. To
5evaluate the probability of having no impact on noise level,
we consider the worst case when all elements in vector ut
equal to the threshold t. In this case, it can be viewed as
that the noise level is shifted down by an amount of t. The
shifted noise e′ follows N (−t, σ2). Therefore, the probability
when the shifted noise variables are within the normal range
of [−3σ, 3σ] can be computed by:
Pl(t) =
3σˆ
−3σ
1
σ2pi
exp
(
− (k + t)
2
2σ2
)
dk. (16)
This probability can be evaluated using equation (14). In
fact, as a large number of elements in ut tend to be much
smaller than t, non-detection probability P (t) > Pl(t). Thus
proposition 1 is proved.
B. Targeted attacks
In practice, adversaries may intend to modify specific state
variables. In this case, the amounts in the targeted subset
in the vector c are fixed. Sparse attack vector construction
methods for targeted attacks have been extensively explored in
the literature, for example [7], [8], [12]. Additionally, certain
measurements may be protected, and adversaries would not
be able to compromise these secured measurements. It is
notable that protecting all measurements may not be feasible
due to the high cost. Therefore, sparse attack vectors need to
be carefully designed to contaminate specific state variables
without compromising those protected measurements.
Let I denotes the indices of state variables that are specif-
ically attacked. I¯ is the complementary set of I and denotes
the indices of state variables that can be arbitrarily chosen in
order to launch targeted attacks. Measurements Jacobian H is
[h1,h2, . . . ,hn] where hi denotes the i-th column vector of
H. A stealth attack vector a can then be written as:
a = Hc =
∑
i∈I
hici +
∑
j∈I¯
hjcj . (17)
In a targeted attack, the value of ci, i ∈ I is fixed and pre-
designed to be injected into the state variables. Let b =∑
i∈I hici, which is pre-designed by attackers. The attack
vector a is then designed based on the fixed vector b. As
proposed in [7] (17) can be transformed using a projection
matrix P = H
(
HTH
)−1
HT . Since a− b = HI¯cI¯ , where
HI¯ denotes the submatrix of H containing columns with
index in I¯, i.e. HI¯ =
[
hj1 ,hj2 , . . . ,hj|I¯|
]
, where ji ∈ I¯
for 1 ≤ i ≤ ∣∣I¯∣∣. By left-multiplying both sides with PI¯ we
have:
PI¯ (a− b) =PI¯HI¯cI¯
=HI¯
(
HTI¯HI¯
)−1
HTI¯HI¯cI¯
=HI¯cI¯ = a− b, (18)
where PI¯ = HI¯
(
HTI¯HI¯
)−1
HTI¯ .
We can then easily obtain that (PI¯ − I) a = (PI¯ − I) b,
let B = P − I, we have the following equivalent criteria for
an attack vector a to be stealth:
BI¯a = BI¯b, (19)
where BI¯ = PI¯ − I.
Since a subset of measurements are protected, those el-
ements in attack vector a should be restricted to 0. Let
y = BI¯b, and assume the p-th measurement is secured,
e.g. ap = 0. Applying the l1-relaxation, the sparse attack
vector can be obtained by solving the following optimization
problem:
min
c
‖Hc‖1
s.t.BI¯Hc = y
Hpc = 0, (20)
where Hp denotes the p-th row of matrix H and minimizing
l1-norm of a vector ‖v‖1 =
√∑
i |vi| can promote v to
be sparse. This problem is well discussed in the field of
compressive sensing [28] and can be quickly solved.
IV. STRATEGIC PROTECTION
Increasing the number of protected measurements can make
the stealth attacks more difficult to be accomplished. It is
obvious that stealth attacks can be completely prevented by
securing all measurements. However, it is not economical
or necessary to secure all measurement devices to defend
against stealth attacks. Authors in [18] explored the minimal
measurement subset that is required to be protected to defend
against attacks using brute-force search. This method is time-
consuming and only feasible for small size power grids. In
this section, an efficient algorithm is proposed to quickly find
measurement protection subsets, which have the same sizes as
that from brute-force method in nearly all cases.
Let the set P ⊂ {1, 2, . . . ,m} be the measurement set that
are secured and the complementary set P¯ denotes the index
of those measurements that can be contaminated. Similar to
(20), adversaries can construct the sparse attack vector a by
solving:
min
c
∥∥∥HP¯c∥∥∥
1
s.t.BI¯Hc = y
HPc = 0. (21)
If the protection set P is properly chosen, specific targeted
attack vectors would not exist. Namely, problem (21) would
have no solutions. Giving specified vector cI , which is the
targeted subset vector of c, the straightforward method is to
protect all measurements in the set corresponding to all non-
zero elements in a that a = HIcI . In this way, it probably
requires a large number of measurements to be protected since
a may not be desirably sparse. Finding or computing the
smallest protection set that can prevent targeted attacks is
difficult. The brute-force search method, which is discussed
in [18], can guarantee finding the smallest possible sets.
However, this method is extremely complex and not feasible
in practice.
When a certain measurement is secured, attackers need to
compromise more measurements or inject extra errors into the
rest of the measurements in order to launch targeted attacks.
From equation (17) we have
a =Hc = b+HIcI¯ , (22)
6Algorithm 2 Greedy subset searching Algorithm
Input: H, I, cI , P .
Initialize: BI¯ = HI¯
(
HTI¯HI¯
)−1
HTI¯−I, y = BI¯HIcI , P ′ =P , k = 1, Pk = P ′.
Iteration: At the k-th iteration:
Compute the complementary set P¯ of P ′.
For i = 1 :
∣∣P¯∣∣
Put the i-th entry in P¯ into Pk: Pk = P ′ ∪ P¯i.
Checking the feasibility of finding c from equation (21).
If feasible
Compute χi = ‖Hc‖1.
else
P ′ = Pk; Quit the iteration.
end
end
Find index i such that χi has the largest value.
Update set P ′ = P ′ ∪ P¯i.
Output: P ′.
where b represents pre-desired injections. It is obvious that
protecting certain measurements can always be more effective
than others. For example, it is more important to secure the
measurements corresponding to the non-zero elements in b
than others. If a subset P of the total measurements are
protected, we have
aP = bP + HP¯I cI¯ = 0 (23)
−bP = HP¯I cI¯ . (24)
If the rank of HP¯I is smaller than protection size |P|, and
the augmented matrix with vector bP can increase the rank,
namely, rank
([
HP¯I |bP
])
= rank
(
HP¯I
)
+1, then cI¯ satisfy-
ing equation (24) does not exist, indicating that the system is
successfully protected from targeted attacks with b. Otherwise,
when vector bP can not increase the rank of matrix HP¯I , i.e.,
rank
([
HP¯I |bP
])
= rank
(
HP¯I
)
, there exist solutions of cI¯ ,
which means adversaries can still find attack vectors to launch
targeted attacks. The problem is then to find the best solution
to obtain highly sparse a. It is known from equation (22) that
making a certain subset P of the measurements immune to
attacks can result in an attack vector a which contaminates
more state variables. This makes the attacks more difficult to
be accomplished. Therefore, it can be deduced that protecting
certain measurement would result in a larger ‖a‖1 value
than that of protecting another measurement. Protecting these
measurements would be more effective than others and these
measurements can be regarded as critical measurements to
targeted attacks. Based on this idea, giving specified targeted
state bias vector cI , we can design a greedy method to search
a small subset of these measurements to be protected to defend
from targeted attacks.
Algorithm 2 presents the greedy search method to find a
small protection subset of measurements with the knowledge
of existing protection set and targeted vector cI . At each
iteration, the algorithm assume that one more measurement
is protected and check the feasibility of constructing attack
vector a. If the stealth attack vector exists when every mea-
surement is protected one by one, the algorithm increases the
protection set by selecting the most important measurement,
which leads to the largest value of ‖a‖1 when it is protected.
The selection process continues until stealth targeted attack
vector does not exist.
For a large power grid system, it is not feasible to find
the smallest protection subset to prevent any of undetectable
attacks that satisfy a =Hc by brute-force search. Instead
we can protect the union set of those subsets selected for
protecting every single state variable. Our proposed method
can quickly find a small subset that protect the whole system
from any stealth attacks satisfying (6). The search procedure
can be concluded in Algorithm 3:
Algorithm 3 Minimal subset selection algorithm
Input: H.
Initialize: P = 0.
For i = 1 : n
Let I = {i}.
Find Pi using algorithm 2.
end
P = P1 ∪ P2 ∪ . . . ∪ Pn.
Output: P .
This method cannot guarantee the smallest subset that can
be found, but it provides at least a quasi-optimal subset
that contains a slightly larger number of elements. Most
importantly, this method is fast and feasible in practice. In
the worst case, to find a protection set with k elements, the
algorithm need to test the feasibility Ka times:
Ka = mk − k (k − 1)
2
. (25)
This figure is much smaller than that using brute-force method,
where it needs to test
∑k−1
i=1
(
m
i
)
+ 1 combinations in the best
case to find the protection set with k elements. Although our
proposed algorithm may not find the global optimum solution,
it provides some flexibility. When it is not possible to protect
certain selected measurement device in practice, the algorithm
can find a sub-optimal subset instead.
V. ROBUST DETECTION
Traditional residue testing based false data detection meth-
ods cannot provide protection of state estimation from care-
fully designed stealth attacks. Therefore new detection meth-
ods need to be designed to detect random errors as well as
stealth attacks. It is shown that a series of measurement data
exhibit low rank and sparse structure, which can be employed
in anomaly detection method [11]. In practice, measurements
tend to be contaminated with noise. Additionally, it also
may happen that some of the measurements are lost due to
the measurement device failures or disrupted communication
links. In this section these situations are addressed.
Considering a time interval T , the power system obtains a
series of measurements [za1, za2, · · · , zaT ] at the time instants
t1, t2, · · · , tT . These measurements can form a matrix Za ∈
Rm×T , which can be decomposed as:
Za = Z + A + E, (26)
7Algorithm 4 RPCA with entry wise constraints
Input: Zpa =PΩ (Za) ∈ Rm×T , ˜ ∈ Rm×T , λ.
Initialize Z = 0, A = 0, Y = 0, µ > 0, ρ > 1, k = 0.
while not converged
1) Update the value of low rank matrix Zk+1:
Zk+1 = D
(
Zpa −Ak + Ykµk , µ
−1
k
)
.
2) Compute the value of sparse matrix Ak+1 by minimiz-
ing:
F (A) = λµ ‖T (A, ˜)‖1 − tr
(
Yk
µk
(A− (Zpa − Zk))
)
+
1
2 ‖A− (Zpa − Zk)‖F .
3) Update the Lagrange multiplier Y:
Yk+1 = Yk + µk (Z
p
a − Zk+1−Ak+1) .
4) Update µk+1 = ρ · µk.
5) Update k = k + 1.
end while
Return Z, A =T (A, ˜).
Output Z, A.
where Z ∈ Rm×T is the block of true measurements with
each column zi representing true measurements at time ti,
A ∈ Rm×T denotes the attack matrix formed by all instant
sparse attacks and E represents the noise.
It is known that fast system dynamics are usually well
damped in the power system. This implies that the system
states would change gradually in a small period T , making the
matrix Z typically low rank. Additionally, malicious injection
data matrix A tends to be sparse. This is due to the fact
that some of the measurements may be protected and also
because attackers would launch attacks with least effort. Given
corrupted measurements matrix Za, it is possible to recover
low rank matrix Z and sparse attack matrix A by performing
low rank and sparse decomposition, which is well discussed in
the robust principle component analysis (PCA) problem [29],
which solves:
min ‖Z‖∗ + λ ‖A‖1
s.t. ‖Za − Z−A‖F ≤ δ, (27)
where ‖·‖∗ denotes the nuclear norm, ‖·‖F denotes the Frobe-
nius norm, δ represents a small positive noise bound and λ
is the regulation parameter. This problem is also addressed
in compressive sensing and matrix completion [30] literature.
Thus true measurements can be recovered and the sparse
perturbations including malicious attacks and other false data
can also be identified.
Unlike coordinated malicious attacks, the missing data in
the measurements can result in residue changes in equation
(5). These incomplete measurement data, as well as the
measurements with errors, would be identified as bad data
by traditional bad data detection algorithms. The proposed
algorithm can not only detect the missing and inaccurate
measurement data, but also detect the carefully designed
stealth attacks, which is undetectable to traditional methods.
More importantly, the proposed algorithm can recover the true
measurements from the incomplete measurments.
In order to address the problem that only noise contaminated
partial measurements are collected, the PCA problem can
be extended to the following form with element wise error
constraints:
min ‖Z‖∗ + λ ‖A‖1
s.t. |PΩ (Za)− PΩ (Z + A)|  , (28)
where  represents element wise inequality and PΩ (·) denotes
a projection operation, in which all elements outside the set Ω
are forced to 0.  is the matrix of entry wise error bounds. It
is demonstrated in [31] that this problem is equivalent to the
following problem:
min ‖Z‖∗ + λ ‖T (A, ˜)‖1
s.t.Za = Z + A, (29)
where ˜ has the same value as  in the projection set Ω
and infinite outside set Ω, and the soft thresholding operation
T (aij) is defined as
T (aij , ) = sign (aij) ·max {|aij | − , 0} . (30)
A variant of the Augmented Lagrangian method (ALM),
which is also known as the Alternating Direction Method
of Multipliers (ADMM) algorithm [32], is used to solve the
problem defined by (29). The Lagrangian corresponding to this
problem is
L (Z,A,Y,µ) = ‖Z‖∗ + λ ‖T (A, ˜)‖1 + 〈Y,H〉+
µ
2
‖H‖22 ,
(31)
where 〈·〉 denotes the Frobenius product, H = Za − Z−A
and µ > 0. λ can be set to
√
m/ |Ω|. We further define the
singular-value thresholding operation as:
D (X, τ) = UT (Σ, τ) VT ,
where τ is the threshold and X = UΣVT . It is notable
that ADMM updates Z,A,Y separately only once in each
iteration thus it is efficient. The convergence of the whole
algorithm is analyzed in [32], which states that the condition
for convergence requires
∑∞
1 µ
−1
k = +∞ where µk denotes
the value of µ in the k-th iteration. The whole process of
solving (29) is shown in Algorithm 4.
It is notable that when incomplete measurements are col-
lected, algorithm 4 will take the missing data to be sparse
anomalies and it can also recover the low rank true measure-
ment matrix and sparse anomaly matrix. However the recovery
accuracy would be impacted as the sparsity is changed. The
recovered sparse attack matrix can ignore those injected data
outside the observation set. Thus it is more difficult to identify
all malicious attacks with partial observations.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, the algorithms introduced above are evalu-
ated by simulations performed based on the IEEE test systems
[33]. The MATLABr package MATPOWER [26] is used to
simulate the power system. The convex optimization problems
are solved using the convex optimization toolbox CVX [34].
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Figure 2. Sparsity of a under different attack conditions
A. Performance of stealth attack construction
The performance of Algorithm 1 which generates highly
sparse undetectable attack vectors is tested in different sce-
narios. Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the probabilities of suc-
cessfully generating undetectable attack vectors with different
levels of sparsity and different attack level ratios respectively.
An attack is regarded as successful when the maximum value
in residue vector does not exceed that without attacks. Sparsity
ratio (SR) is defined as k/m, where k is the number of non-
zero elements in a and m is the size of a. The attack level
ratio (ALR) is defined as the maximum attack value C to the
mean value of the state variables: Cmean(θ) . Generally, these
figures reveal that there are high probabilities for Algorithm 1
to successfully generate highly sparse undetectable attacks.
The noise in the simulation is modelled as Gaussian dis-
tributed with zero-mean. The signal to noise ratio (SNR)
indicates the noise level compared with true measurements
in the simulation. The noise may due to measuring devices
and process, or due to the communication channel noise. It is
clear in Figure 3a and Figure 4a that in a relatively noisy case,
the probability of a successful attack is extremely high (close
to 1). In the low noise case, there is also high probability
of injecting a successful highly sparse undetectable malicious
attack. The algorithm is also assessed using different power
grid system models, which is shown in Figure 3b and Figure
4b. It is notable that in a larger bus system, Algorithm 1 can
provide a better performance even for extremely sparse attacks
and high ALRs. For example, the success ratio is around 90%
for IEEE 118-Bus system to generate stealth attacks with SR
lower than 0.1, compared with 75% for IEEE 14-bus system
showed in Figure 3b. This probability is 100% for IEEE 118-
bus system to generate attacks with ALR= 1 compared to
80% for IEEE 57-bus system showed in Figure 4b. Therefore,
it can be anticipated that the algorithm would have a better
performance in a real power system, which is much larger than
the tested systems.
Additionally, it can be seen from Figure 3 that it is always
harder to inject sparser attacks while Figure 4 reveals that
attacks with higher values would be more likely to be de-
Table I
THE NUMBER OF MEASUREMENTS IN PROTECTION SETS FROM TWO
METHODS
Test systems Algorithm 2 Brute-force search
IEEE 9-bus 9 8
IEEE 14-bus 15 13
IEEE 39-bus 59 -
IEEE 57-bus 84 -
IEEE 118-bus 187 -
tected. Figure 3c and Figure 4c display the performance when
injecting attacks with different ALRs and SRs. It is notable
that in Figure 4c the algorithm utilizes randomly selected
columns in a basis matrix of Null(B) rather than that with the
largest variance. The results imply that using randomly chosen
columns can also successfully inject undetectable attacks with
high probabilities.
It is known that stealth attacks having m−n nonzero entries
can always be found. In IEEE 57-bus system, this figure is 80,
for which the sparsity ratio is about 59%. However, by using
Algorithm 1 there is still a high probability that attackers can
inject undetectable attacks with sparsity ratios lower than 59%.
Even for an attack with SR lower than 0.05, the success rate
is still around 80% when the SNR is 10 dB and ALR is 0.5.
Targeted attack construction method in (20) is assessed un-
der different attack conditions in which different percentage of
total state variables are assumed to be modified. The targeted
set is randomly selected and the protected measurement is also
randomly chosen. It can be observed from Figure 2 that, in
order to precisely alter specified state variables the coordinated
attack vectors can not be highly sparse. Thus attackers need
to compromise a number of measurements to launch targeted
attacks. Highly sparse attacks can only be achieved when the
percentage of targeted state variables is extremely low for
certain test systems. For example, SR can be less than 0.1 for
IEEE 39-bus system when a small number of state variables
are targeted. The figure also shows that in some cases, sparsity
ratio of attacks are 0. They correspond to the cases that: For
certain targeted set of state variables, no feasible attack vectors
exist when the p-th measurement is protected. Therefore, it
implies that when certain carefully selected measurements
are protected, attackers may not be able to injected targeted
attacks.
B. Performance of strategic protection
This section evaluates our proposed protection algorithm.
To compare the protection subset generated by the proposed
algorithm with that from brute-force method, we apply IEEE-9
bus system, which contain 17 total measurements, and IEEE-
14 bus system with 33 total measurements. Table I shows
the number of measurements in protection subset found by
two methods. The results from the proposed algorithm for
other larger test systems are also provided. In the first two
test systems the smallest protection sets generated from the
proposed algorithm contain only slightly more measurements
than that from brute-force method. In IEEE-14 bus system,
the difference of this number is quite small compared to the
total number of 33 measurements. Thus, Algorithm 2 can find
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Figure 3a. Probabilities of successful attack
injections under different SNRs for IEEE-57
bus system. Attack level ratio is 0.5.
Figure 3b. Probabilities of successful attack
injections for different bus systems. Attack
level ratio is 0.5 and SNR=10 dB.
Figure 3c. Probabilities of successful attack
injections for different attack level ratios for
IEEE-57 bus system. SNR=10 dB.
Figure 3. Probabilities of successful attack injections
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
ALR
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
 
 
SNR 6dB
SNR 8dB
SNR 10dB
SNR 12dB
SNR 14dB
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
ALR
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
 
 
IEEE 14−Bus
IEEE 39−Bus
IEEE 57−Bus
IEEE 118−Bus
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
ALR
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
 
 
SR 0.15
SR 0.30
SR 0.45
SR 0.60
Figure 4a. Probabilities of successful attack
injections under different SNRs for IEEE-57
bus system. Sparsity ratio is 0.4.
Figure 4b. Probabilities of successful attack
injections for different bus systems. Sparsity
ratio is 0.4 and SNR=10 dB.
Figure 4c. Probabilities of successful attack
injections for different sparsity ratios in IEEE-
57 bus system. SNR=10 dB.
Figure 4. Probabilities of successful attack injections. Figure 4c utilizes random columns in Null(B) rather than that with largest variance.
Table II
THE NUMBER OF TESTING TIMES FOR TWO ALGORITHMS TO FIND PROTECTION SUBSETS
Test systems Bus number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
IEEE-9 Bus Algorithm 2 55 70 1 18 34 75 40 25 - - - - -Brute-force search 1434 834 1 18 154 835 235 25 - - - - -
IEEE-14 Bus Algorithm 2 1 35 39 2 42 71 107 72 109 123 141 135 183Brute-force search 1 35 36 2 73 629 7108 630 7140 6235 6236 6237 7109
protection subsets with similar number of elements but spend
much less time than brute-force method.
Figure 5 displays the number of elements in the smallest
protection subsets to protect every single state variable from
being targeted by adversaries. The whole system protection
subsets showed in Table I are the unions of the protection
subsets for protecting single variables. From both figures it
can be seen that in most cases the proposed algorithm can
find a protection subset having the same size as that found
by brute-force method. The size differences are only 1 or 2
when the two methods find subsets with different number of
elements. This number is quite small compared with the total
number of 33 measurements in IEEE-14 bus.
Table II compares the complexities of the two algorithms
in terms of the number of feasibility testing times. The results
correspond with the simulation showed in Figure 5 in which
measurement protection subsets are searched for protecting
every single state variable. It is obvious that when the size of
protection subset exceeds 3, the difference of the two methods
becomes significant. This difference is more significant when
the size of protection subset is bigger as the brute-force search
needs to exhaust all subset combinations with smaller sizes.
It is also clear that in a larger power system the difference is
much larger for two algorithms to find a subset with same
size as that in a smaller system. The testing times of the
proposed algorithm will increase only slightly when the size
of protection subset and the system scale grow, which is also
described by equation (25). In a real power system, while
brute-force method is infeasible because of the combinatorial
complexity, the proposed method instead is fast and practical.
C. Performance of detection
The performance of the detection algorithm is tested on
IEEE 14-bus system and IEEE 57-bus system. The malicious
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Figure 5. Number of protected measurements to protect every single state variable from being targeted
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Figure 6. Probability of successful false data detection
attack vectors are constructed using our proposed Algorithm
1. In order to obtain sparsity in the rows of the attack block
matrix, different column vectors in the null-space in Algorithm
1 are utilized. The sparsity ratio of the attacks is chosen
as 15%. In Figure 4c it is showed that when SR= 0.15
traditional residual testing based algorithms will not be able to
detect those attacks. Thus, in the simulation, the algorithm is
not compared with traditional methods. Additionally, recently
proposed algorithms such as [23] do not deal with partial
observations. These algorithms do not address the problem
of error contaminated measurements as well. The detection
method discussed in this paper addresses both propblems.
Most importantly, it can not only detect anomalies but also
recover the true measurements from partial contaminated
observations.
We use the false alarm rate (FAR) which is the probability
of positive alarm when there are no attacks. The noise per-
formance of the algorithm compared to RPCA with Frobenius
constraints in (27) has been extensively studied in [31]. In this
Table III
DETECTION PROBABILITY AND MEASUREMENTS DEVIATION WITH
PARTIAL OBSERVATIONS
Observations (%) Detection probability (%) Variable deviation (%)
100 100 0.53
95 92 2.06
90 56.3 3.7
85 44.7 5.3
paper we focus on identifying anomalies in different scenarios
when undetectable attacks are injected in power systems.
Figure 6 shows the error tolerance performance in the IEEE
14-bus system. It is shown that when false alarm rate exceeds
10%, the algorithm can identify attacks with high probabilities
which are approaching 100%. This probability is still quite
high in the presence of highly dense noise (95%). When FAR
decreases, the system will absorb more noise and detection
probability decreases. It can be seen that there is still a high
chance of detecting anomalies: more than 90% when FAR
decreases to an extremely low level (0.025) under SNR=10
dB.
In the case where partial measurements are collected, miss-
ing data are regarded as sparse anomalies in Algorithm 4.
Additionally, non-zero entries in sparse matrix A can only be
confirmed as attacks when they are located in the observation
set. This make identifications of attacks more difficult. Algo-
rithm 4 can circumvent this problem since it also recovers the
block of true measurements. We evaluate the attack detection
probabilities as well as the deviation rate of the recovered
measurement variables, which is defined as ‖z− z′‖2 / ‖z‖2.
Table III shows the results when incomplete measurements
are collected based on the IEEE 57-bus system. The FAR
equals 0.05 and SNR is set to 8dB. It can be seen that attack
detection probability declines greatly with increasing missing
observations. However the recovered measurement variables
experience only small deviations. Therefore, the proposed
algorithm can successfully verify the true measurements, even
in the situation that only partial measurements are observed.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we looked into the problem of malicious
false data injection attacks in power grid state estimation.
We proposed stealth attack construction strategies for different
scenarios and also introduced the countermeasures. It is shown
that our proposed random attack construction algorithm can
generate extremely sparse attack vectors. These optimal or
quasi-optimal attacks can be achieved with high probability of
success. The targeted undetectable attacks are obtained based
on a optimization framework. The results show that attack
vectors in this scenario can not be extremely sparse, which
is also discussed in literature. An efficient protection scheme
is proposed in this paper to find an effective measurement
protection subset to defend from the stealth attacks. The
simulation results reveal that this subset searching algorithm
can find a subset with almost the same size as that from
the brute-force method. Additionally, a detection algorithm
is introduced to detect the stealth attacks as well as other
false data. This algorithm considers the case in which only
partial measurements are collected in the presence of noise.
The performance is demonstrated via the simulation results
based on IEEE test power systems.
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